Hithium’s second A1 submission positions its Texas site as evidence of its global reach and Western integration. Hithium within the filing describes their Texas site as a 10GWh “production base,” a major U.S. foothold, and a key piece of the company’s strategy to strengthen its overseas manufacturing. Although on paper, it looks like a milestone, in practice, it raises more questions and underscores a massive looming liability for the company. The disclosures like Hithium’s broader filings are selective, optimistic and carefully choose which details to omit in order to create a narrative that paints Hithium favorably. This breaks down under careful analysis and scrutiny. (Note: All page references in this article refer to the internal pagination within the following document)

According to the A1, Hithium’s Texas facility spans almost half a million square feet (p. 202) and has already entered mass production according to the listing. The description implies a fully integrated manufacturing operation as was the original plan. Yet the filing avoids stating the most important fact about the site which is that the Texas plant does not manufacture batteries but rather it assembles them. Every core component, from cells to modules to enclosures are shipped from China, more often than not they are preassembled. As such, the facility functions as a final-stage packaging point rather than a true production hub. This distinction matters because the plant offers no benefits from U.S. national‑security scrutiny and provides no domestic‑content advantages. U.S. Regulators still treat the operation as a Chinese outpost on U.S. soil, and customers remain ineligible for federal credits or reimbursement programs that require genuine U.S. manufacturing.

The filing suggests that having a U.S. base may reduce tariff pressure (p.232). This is misleading as under U.S. trade law, as well as the restructuring of tariff policy under Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” assembly does not qualify as domestic production. The batteries remain classified as Chinese goods and continue to be subject to tariffs that can reach up to 34 percent. The filing is also quick to highlight that both China and the United States have suspended 24 percent of these reciprocal tariffs for one year following the Xi–Trump trade truce, but this window is temporary and does not change the core classification issue. Investors reading Hithium’s filing would reasonably assume the Texas plant reduces tariff exposure and that tariffs are not a pressing issue.

The same pattern appears in the filing’s treatment of property ownership (image on the left taken from p.232-233). Hithium lists the Texas land as an asset without noting the policy constraints that govern it. Under current U.S. rules, Chinese-owned firms operating in strategic sectors are restricted from owning or leasing land for more than one year. This restriction directly affects the long-term viability and operational value of the Texas site. Which should have been disclosed clearly. Instead, the filing presents the asset as stable and secure when it is neither.

Another omission concerns Hithium’s national security designation. In addition, Hithium’s own financials reveal that its subsidies exceed its profits; with government grants of RMB11.2 million, RMB101.0 million, RMB414.1 million, RMB120.3 million and RMB334 million across 2022, 2023, 2024, and the first half of 2024 and 2025, the company would have reported losses without these PRC government grants, given that its net profits for 2024 and the first half of 2025 were only RMB287.6 million and RMB212.8 million.

Under Section 154 of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the company is prohibited from contracting with the Department of Defense or its suppliers. Any U.S. customer working with Hithium becomes ineligible for federal reimbursement programs and energy-credit incentives. This means that Hithium’s competitors can offer rates that are 29.9% higher than Hithium’s pricing as Hithium’s customers will not receive the 30% tax back credits. For a company claiming rapid U.S. expansion, this is a critical limitation. The filing does not address it.

Taken together, these gaps in disclosure point to a broader issue. Hithium frames its Texas facility as a symbol of international progress, but the reality described by the facts is different. The Texas site does not reduce tariff exposure, does not provide manufacturing independence, does not offer long-term land security, and does not grant access to the full U.S. market. What remains is an operation constrained by regulation and dependent on Chinese supply chains, presented in the filing as a strategic advantage while in reality there are glaring omissions.

For investors and regulators evaluating Hithium’s A1 submission reveals a company promoting a narrative of Western integration while omitting the structural limitations that undermine it. Hithium’s expansion story relies on omission, not operational strength, and that the company’s U.S. strategy remains shaped more by constraints than by capability.